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ANTITRUST LAW-CoMPLETE DIVESTITURE OF DU PONT STOCK-
HOLDING IN GENERAL MOTORS HE To BE ONLY EF FECTIV
REMEDY UNDER SECTIO 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
After the Supreme Court held in 1957 1 that du Pont's forty-year-old
acquisition of a quarter of the stock of General Motors had ripened into a
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act,2 the Court remanded the case,
giving the district court "large discretion" to formulate a remedy. On
remand, the district court rejected a Government plan of divestiture which
called for pro rata distribution of GM stock to du Pont shareholders over
a ten-year period and accepted a du Pont proposal whereby voting rights
in the du Pont-held stock would "pass through" to du Pont shareholders.3
This plan was so limited that neither of two holding companies with large
interests in du Pont, nor their officers and directors, nor officers and
directors of du Pont, nor their families, could exercise the voting rights
allocable to them. In addition, the district court enjoined all direct or
indirect management relationships and preferential or discriminatory trade
relations or contracts between the two companies. The Government ap-
pealed, and the Supreme Court, finding the "pass through" remedy "in-
effective," directed complete divestiture. United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
There have been few Clayton Act cases in which the issue of the proper
formulation of a remedy has been raised, but, among these, divestiture has
been required in every fully litigated suit instituted by the United States.
4
Because of the scarcity of Clayton Act precedent, the Court in the present
case turned to Sherman Act decisions for guidance. In the American
Tobacco case,5 the Court listed three criteria to be considered in formulating
1 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), reversing
126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. 11. 1954).
264 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
8 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill.
1959).
4 E.g., Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960); see United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass.
1919), modification denied, 292 Fed. 511 (D. Mass. 1923), in which the court ordered
divestiture of seven out of eight stockholdings and ordered the eighth merged with
the parent company to provide competition with a Sherman Act violator which had
been joined in the same suit. But cf. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958)
(private litigation in which a remedy less than total divestiture was not challenged
on appeal). In the present case, the Supreme Court refused to give weight to quid
pro quo bargaining in Clayton Act consent decrees such as United States v. Schenley
Indus., Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. 72700 (D. Del. 1957). Instant case at 330 n.12.
5United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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a remedy: (1) that it be effective in carrying out the purpose of the
statute; (2) that it take account of the general public interest; and (3)
that it avoid the risk of unnecessary property loss to innocent parties.
6
Implicit in American Tobacco's second criterion is the "rule of reason"
enunciated in the companion Standard Oil case,7 under which the courts
have condoned some practices that would appear to violate the terms of
the antitrust laws, because they have been found to be "in the public
interest." 8 Importing this concern for "public interest" into the area of
antitrust remedies, the second criterion has allowed courts dealing with
cases of proved antitrust violations to refrain from decreeing dissolution
where the continued existence of the violating company has been shown to
be in the public interest.9 The desire to protect private interests-the third
criterion-has not weighed so heavily; generally, it has not been allowed
to impair the standard of effectiveness-the first criterion-unless it has
coincided with protection of the public interest. 10 Thus the second criterion
laid down in American Tobacco seems to have been of pivotal importance
in determining the Supreme Court's approach to antitrust remedies. When
no harm to the public has been foreseen, the Court has attended exclusively
to the standard of effectiveness, ignoring possible damage to private in-
terests." And when the Court has in fact considered private interests, it
has also used language indicating a concern for the public interest.'2 When
a trial court, seeking to devise an appropriate remedy, looks to public and
private interests, it will weigh defendant's economic evidence going to the
dangers of divestiture, on the one hand, and the reasonableness, on the
other, of some activity midway between the earlier proved violation and
complete separation.
In the present case such evidence, showing vast potential for injury
to a large number of stockholders, apparently persuaded the lower court
to modify the traditional stress on "effectiveness" in situations in which the
harsher remedy would not injure but rather promote the public interest.13
The district court relied on the broad mandate given by the Supreme Court
6 Id. at 185.
"Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
8 See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ; Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950), inodification denied, 153 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
10 See, e.g., International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944). But see United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951).
11 See cases cited note 10 supra.
12 See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187 (1911). One
factor causing confusion and ambiguity of terminology in this area is the tendency
to equate a large or important private interest with the public interest. See The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 198-99 (1961).
1 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 14 (N.D.
11. 1959): "[T]he primary public purpose should be achieved so far as possible
without inflicting unnecessary injury upon innocent stockholders. .. ."
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on the first appeal 14 and exercised its discretion not to decree divestiture.
The Supreme Court, in reversing, reiterated the general rule that a remedy
must be "effective," 15 but went on to define effectiveness in such a way as
to make it incompatible with retention of any power to transfer offending
shares.16 Seizing on the defendant's evidence that divestiture might cause
serious injury, the majority pointed out that allowing du Pont to retain
power to threaten such consequences would leave the company with an
important potential anticompetitive weapon. The majority's strict defini-
tion of effectiveness is equally applicable to all stockholdings between large
corporations if they violate section 7, and it would seem to rule out any
remedy other than the one which removes all possibility of transfer-
complete divestiture. Further, the Court's disposition of the case17 was
inconsistent with any real interest in finding an effective remedy short of
divestiture. Had the majority been considering any but an automatic
remedy that can be generalized to all cases involving interrelated large
corporations, it most logically should have remanded for further hearings
on the issue of effective remedies,' 8 or, alternatively, it might have waited to
see how effective in fact the "pass through" remedy proved to be-reserving
divestiture as an ultimate solution. Instead, on a record which it found
"hardly of material assistance in reaching a judgment on the central
issue," "I the Court undertook to reverse the district court's carefully hedged
decree on the same central issue of effectiveness. 20 Respondents' main
argument in the present case--that many stockholders and large amounts
of capital would be adversely affected-would not be pertinent in cases in
which the stockholding was small and the stockholders few; divestiture-
admittedly the most effective remedy-should be applied in these cases as
a matter of course. On the other hand, when the sums and the number of
stockholders increase, the violation is increasingly likely to fall within the
province of the present case, in which such offending stockholding can
be "effectively" remedied only by divestiture. Thus the Court, though
rejecting the Government's contention that the language of the Clayton
Act requires divestiture,2 1 came close to adopting a "per se" approach to
Clayton Act remedies which achieved the same effect.
22
14 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607-08 (1957).
15 Instant case at 328.
16 Instant case at 332. On the basis of the same definition the majority also
rejected du Pont's suggestion that its GM stock be completely disenfranchised. In-
stant case at 333.
17 Instant case at 334: "We therefore direct complete divestiture."
18 One factor that may also have militated strongly against this disposition was
the already prodigious length of the litigation-twelve years. See instant case at 335.
19 Instant case at 326.
2 0 Instant case at 328.
21 Instant case at 328 n.9.
2 Compare Comment, 58 MicH. L. REv. 1024, 1043 (1960), where it is suggested
that the district court in the instant case "crystallized" a rule of reason approach to
remedies first enunciated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp.
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), modification denied, 153 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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The attempt to summarize the opinion of the majority in terms of a
"per se" requirement of divestiture is weakened by the theory, advanced
by writers 23 and hinted at by the dissent in the present case,24 that the
plurality of the Court fairly abandoned general legal principles in its effort
to deal effectively with the huge industrial complexes involved in the case.
Such a theory can obscure the fact that the decision may also be grounded
on "neutral principles" that have precedential value. In its first adjudica-
tion of the instant case, the Court rested its decision on an application,
albeit new and unexpected, of the Clayton Act to the unique problem
before it.25 Similarly, the present opinion can be seen as establishing a rule
that mitigating economic evidence, even if admitted, should not weigh in
favor of a remedy that leaves in the hands of a large corporate violator the
power to wreak havoc by transferring legal title to wrongfully held stock.
Such a position is a less extreme departure from precedent than the con-
struction of section 7 articulated on the first appeal. Divestiture has been
the uniform remedy in stock acquisition cases. 26 It is the natural remedy,
since it serves effectively to reverse the process of acquisition and to elim-
inate the restraints on competition found to violate the statute.27 It was
the remedy for which Congress expressed preference during deliberations
on the passage of the Clayton Act,28 and which the Federal Trade Com-
mission is permitted to impose for violations of section 7.29 Though such
a "per se" remedy gives little consideration to affected stockholders,
Congress retains the power to offer them necessary relief, especially in the
area of income tax.3° Further, the evidence of stockholder injury which
such a rule would exclude is uncertain and ambiguous evidence at best.81
23 See, e.g., Markham, The dit Pont-General Motors Decision, 43 VA. L. REv. 881
(1957); The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HAgv. L. REv. 85, 165-70 (1957).
24 Instant case at 377 (dissenting opinion): "The essential appeal of the Govern-
ment~s position lies in its excitation of fear of any intercorporate relationship between,
two such colossi as du Pont and General Motors. It is easy to calm this fear by a
requirement of divestiture."
25 The court held that § 7, in its original form, applied to vertical acquisitions
and that the anticompetitive effects of an acquisition were to be determined as of the
time suit was brought, not as of the time of the acquisition. United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590, 596-98 (1957).
26 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); cases cited note 4 supra. See gen-
erally AT'y' GEN. NAiTL Comm. ANTITRUST RE. 356 (1955).
2 7 Compare instant case at 329: "The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing
of the acquisition is a natural remedy."
28 See, e.g., 51 CONG. REc. 14328 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh); 51 CoNG.
Rzc. 14520 (1914) (letter from the attorney general's secretary reprinted).
2938 Stat 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958). The language indi-
cates that Congress intended to require the Federal Trade Commission to order
dissolution in cases of § 7 violations. ' See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v.
FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). Compare instant case at 328 n.9.
30 Congress has in fact passed a bill intended to mitigate the tax consequences of
the divestiture. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 8 (city ed.). President
Kennedy is expected to sign the bill shortly.
31 Indeed, the present case offers an example of the fallibility of economists testi-
fying on behalf of defendant companies. Du Pont's witnesses predicted that divesti-
ture would have a serious depressant effect on du Pont and GM stock. Yet five
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Such a disregard of ambiguous economic evidence could have a salutary
effect in analogous cases of smaller magnitude than the present one. The
case should be treated, therefore, not as a unique exercise of judicial
surgery upon corporate giants, but as the introduction of a "per se" approach
to weighing economic evidence into the field of Clayton Act remedies.
BONDS-ITER Vivos GIFT OF U.S. SAvINGs BONDs GIVEs DONEE
Aw EQUITABLE RIGHT TO PROCEEDS DESPITE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
oN NONTR NSFERABILITY AND SURVIVORSHIP
A purchaser of United States Series E savings bonds which were
registered in her name and that of her brother I endorsed the bonds, handed
them to her husband, and said that she wished him to have them. After
her death, her personal representative petitioned for a declaratory judg-
ment to determine whether the brother or the husband owned the bonds.
Reversing a lower court decision that an informal inter vivos gift could not
transfer ownership of the bonds in contravention of the United States
Savings Bonds Regulations, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the federal regulations apply only to payment by the United States and
not to the eventual disposition of the proceeds, and that the husband was
entitled to the proceeds. Neglia Estate, 403 Pa. 464, 170 A.2d 357 (1961).
Federal regulations prescribing the terms upon which savings bonds
may be issued, redeemed, and transferred 2 provide that Series E bonds
may not be transferred or pledged and may be redeemed only by an owner
named on the bond.3 State courts hold with near unanimity 4 that when,
months after the result in the instant case was announced, quotations of du Pont and
GM stock had advanced appreciably from their previous highs. Compare N.Y. Times,
May 20, 1961, p. 27, col. 5 (late city ed.), itl N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1961, p. 48, col. 5
(city ed.).
'Ten bonds were registered in coownership form: "A or B." Under the ap-
plicable regulations, payment of such bonds will be made to either coowner, and such
payment terminates all interest in the other. If either dies before requesting payment,
the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner. Reissuance to eliminate
a name or to substitute another is possible at the request of both coowners when the
requisite familial relationship between them exists or when there has been a marriage
or divorce. 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.60-.61 (1959). Six bonds were registered in beneficiary
form: "A payable on death to B." B wilI be recognized as the sole and absolute
owner at A's death if A has not previously requested payment. Reissuance to sub-
stitute the name of another for that of the beneficiary is possible with the latter's
consent. 31 C.F.R. §§ 315.65(b) (2), .66 (1959).
2 Such regulations are promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury under
authority of the Second Liberty Bond Act § 22, 40 Stat 288 (1917), as amended,
31 U.S.C. § 757c(a) (1958).
3 31 C.F.R. § 315.15 (1959). Specific exceptions to this general rule are not
applicable in the instant case. See 31 C.F.R. §§315.16, .21-.22(b) (1959).
4But see Succession of Gladney, 223 La. 949, 67 So. 2d 547 (1953) (coowner
could cash bonds but would be indebted to decedent-purchaser's estate); Slater v.
Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953) (regulations, being solely for conven-
ience of the Treasury, do not operate, on death of W, to make H sole owner of bonds
purchased with community funds by W in name of "H or W"; W's legatees entitled
to one-half of the bonds); Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup.
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in the absence of unjust enrichment,6 the estate of a deceased purchaser
claims Government bonds, the federal regulations must be applied to
exclude state law and confirm ownership in a surviving coowner or
beneficiary. 6 This result is ordinarily reached by either of two routes: by
recognizing (1) that the Treasury regulations form part of the contract
between the bond purchaser and the Government and are therefore binding
on both parties,7 or (2) that since regulation of the issuance, redemption,
and transfer of bonds is necessary and proper to effectuate Congress'
constitutional power to borrow money, regulations issued by the Treasury
under congressional authority have the force of federal law and must be
applied by virtue of the supremacy clause of the Constitution.8 The two
theories are often expressed concurrently.9 However, neither the apparent
clarity of the Treasury regulations nor the theories of contract and federal
supremacy have prevented the effect of the regulations from being modi-
fied.'0  One court has enforced a coowner's testamentary disposition."
Others ' 2 have recognized inter vivos gifts by sole owners 13 or gifts by
Ct. 1942); Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939). The last two
cases were overruled by subsequent legislation providing that the regulations must
be applied to the exclusion of state property laws. See N.Y. PEns. PRoP. LAW § 24;
WASH. REv. CODE § 11.04.230 (1956). See generally Note, 52 YALE LJ. 917 (1943).
5 See note 10 infra.
6 See, e.g., Umberger v. Westmoreland, 218 Ark. 632, 640, 238 S.W.2d 495, 500
(1951) ; It re Stanley's Estate, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P.2d 332 (1938) ; Horstman Estate,
398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1960).7 See, e.g., Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 735, 196 S.W.2d 369, 372
(1946) ; Horstman Estate, .spra note 6, at 510, 159 A.2d at 516 (1960).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Janowitz, 257 U.S. 42 (1921); United States v.
Sacks, 257 U.S. 37 (1921) ; United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp.
73, 75-77 (M.D. Pa. 1943).
9 See, e.g., Ex pare Little, 259 Ala. 532, 535-36, 67 So. 2d 818, 820-21 (1953);
Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 734-35, 196 S.W.2d 369, 371-72 (1946).
10 One common area of modification which is not directly relevant to the issue
of the instant case is where, in the absence of any attempted transfer by the pur-
chaser, courts have required a surviving coowner or beneficiary to surrender the
proceeds of bonds in order to remedy a fraud or prevent unjust enrichment. Thus,
in In re Lundvall, 242 Iowa 430, 46 N.W.2d 535 (1951), and Katz v. Lockman, 356
Pa. 196, 51 A.2d 619 (1947), a confidential relationship had been abused to obtain
a change in the registration of the bonds. Other cases involve bonds purchased with
money not belonging to the purchaser. Petersen v. Swan, 239 Minn. 98, 57 N.W.2d
842 (1953); cf. Henderson's Adm'r v. Bewley, 264 S.W.2d 680 (Ky. 1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 926 (1955) (use of community funds by wife to buy bonds in name
of wife and third person). A surviving spouse who would otherwise be entitled to
the proceeds of bonds is often required to convey the proceeds to the estate of one
who is entitled to them under a property settlement in connection with divorce. See,
e.g., Roman v. Smith, 228 Ark. 833, 314 S.W.2d 225 (1958); Tharp v. Besozzi, 128
Ind. App. 73, 144 N.E.2d 430 (1957); Tanner v. Ervin, 250 N.C. 602, 109 S.E.2d
460 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
11 Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953). Contra, In the Matter
of the Estate of Haas, 10 N.J. Super. 581, 587, 77 A.2d 523, 526 (1950) ; ef. Fidelity
Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J. Eq. 474, 55 A.2d 26 (Ct. of Err. & App. 1947)
(attempted gift causa mortis).
1
2 The majority view is contrary. See, e.g., Moore's Adm'r v. Marshall, 302
Ky. 729, 196 S.W.2d 369 (1946) ; In re Nettle's Estate, 91 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Surr. Ct.
1949), aff'd, 276 App. Div. 929, 94 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1950); Brown v. Vinson, 188
Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748 (1949).
13 Marshall v. Felker, 156 Fla. 476, 23 So. 2d 555 (1945) (semble). Effectu-
ation of a sole owner's bequest or gift causa mortis is now provided for by 31 C.F.R.
§§315.70, .22(b) (1959).
1962]
442 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110
purchasers to their coowners. 14 The instant case, however, is the first to
hold valid an inter vivos gift which divests a coowner of the interest to
which he is apparently entitled under the Treasury regulations.
In considering the gift as transferring the right to proceeds, the court
in the present case may appear to have circumvented the federal rule on
nontransferability. The court's intention, however, appears to be not
circumvention but a compromise between the legitimate federal purpose in
limiting transfers and the interest of the state in preserving ordinary modes
of property disposition under local law.15 Although an actual conflict be-
tween the federal regulations and state law would have compelled deference
to federal supremacy,16 the court avoided this ultimate decision by pointing
out that control by the regulations terminates with payment.1 7 After
that, disposition of the proceeds can be governed by local law.'8 The
language of the regulations themselves lends some'support to this approach.
14 E.g., Silverman v. McGinnes, 259 F.,d 731 (3d Cir. 1958); Broderick v.
Moore, 226 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1955) ; In re Hendricksen's Estate, 156 Neb. 463, 56
N.W.2d 711, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953); Littlejohn v. County Judge, 79 N.D.
550, 58 N.W.2d 278 (1953). The issue in most of these cases was inclusion of the
bonds in purchaser's estate for estate tax purposes.
15 The very restrictions which might appear to bar the gift in the present case
were created by the Treasury to reserve savings bonds for people of modest means
with little sophistication in matters such as certified requests for payment and transfer
by formal reissuance. Such people would ordinarily be inclined to treat bonds as
they would checks and other negotiable paper with which they have daily contact.
The development of the savings bonds regulations indicates increasing recognition
of the importance of allowing a purchaser to deal with bonds in many of the familiar
ways sanctioned by state law. Thus, the regulations now recognize not only a sole
owner's testamentary disposition of bonds, 31 C.F.R. §315.70 (1959), but his gift
of them causa mortis, 31 C.F.R. § 315.22(b) (1959).
16 Such a conflict may exist when bonds which would be part of a decedent's
estate under state property law are claimed by a surviving coowner or beneficiary
under the federal regulations. See cases cited in notes 4, 6 supra. Even if reasoning
similar to that in the present case might avoid a supremacy conflict in such cases,
confidence in savings bonds is better maintained by giving effect to the federal pro-
visions for survivorship, 31 C.F.R. §§315.61, .66 (1959), upon which purchasers
presumably rely. In the present case, however, the court applied local law to the
disposition of the proceeds in order to effectuate the manifest intent of a decedent to
make a nontestamentary gift.
17 Instant case at 469, 170 A.2d at 359; accord, Katz v. Driscoll, 86 Cal. App. 2d
313, 322, 194 P.2d 822, 828 (Dist. Ct App. 1948); In re Hendricksen's Estate, 156
Neb. 463, 477, 56 N.W.2d 711, 719, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 854 (1953).
18 In the instant case, the court avoided the anomaly of one person's having
possession of the bonds and the right to their proceeds with no right to cash them,
while another has power to compel payment by the Government but neither possession
of the bonds nor the right to their proceeds, see Marshall v. Felker, 156 Fla. 476,
23 So. 2d 555 (1945), by suggesting that although this was a declaratory action, it
would be willing to compel the surviving coowner to deliver the proceeds in an
appropriate proceeding, see instant case at 470-71, 170 A.2d at 359-60. Presumably,
the court would employ the device of a constructive trust, which arises when a person
holding legal title to property is obliged to convey it to another if retention would
cause unjust enrichment. See 4 ScoT, TRUSTS § 462, at 3103 (2d ed. 1956). See
generally id. §§ 462-.2. Although unjust enrichment need not be founded on fraud
or other oppressive conduct, see the property settlement cases cited in note 10 supra,
their absence calls for nicer distinctions. In deciding who has the better right to
the proceeds, the court should avoid drawing the issue in terms of the relative strength
of the purchaser's donative intent vis i. vis the competing claimants, see notes 30-31
infra and accompanying text, which is the issue that would have to be resolved if
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Rather than flatly characterizing the surviving coowner or beneficiary as
the sole and absolute owner, they merely provide that a survivor will be
"recognized" as such.' 9 The implication is that the survivor will be
recognized as owner for federal purposes only.20 Although the regulations
do not contemplate a dichotomy of ownership between legal and equitable
interests, they do not prohibit it,21 and the court's use of this fiction to make
legally significant a completed manual delivery with donative intent 22 does
the court used the device of a resulting trust, see 4 ScoTT, op. cit. sipra § 441.4.
Rather, the court should decide the preliminary question whether a purchaser can
terminate the conditional interest of a coowner by endorsing bonds and delivering
them as a gift, just as he can by cashing them. See note 22 infra. And if it concludes
that the purchaser can and did successfully terminate the coowner's interest, the court
could then find that the latter's retention of the proceeds would be unjust, by analogy
to cases which hold that when a would-be donor dies, mistakenly thinking that he
has made an effective gratuitous conveyance, his heirs can be compelled to transfer
the property to the putative donee. See Laundreville v. Mero, 86 Mont 43, 281
Pac. 749 (1929) ; Huss v. Morris, 63 Pa. 367 (1869). See generally ScoTT, op. cit.
smpra § 4662.
1931 C.F.R. §§ 315.61, .66 (1959). Similarly, they provide that the form of
registration will merely be "considered as" conclusive of ownership. 31 C.F.R.
§ 315.5 (1959). The validity of the court's approach in the instant case is not cast
in doubt by the provision that no judicial decision will be recognized which would
impair the "rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a surviving
coowner or beneficiary," 31 C.F.R. §315.20(a) (1959), for the Treasury itself
apparently recognizes that a party other than a surviving coowner or beneficiary
can have a right to bonds, although it is unwilling to increase its duties in ascertaining
whether a registered coowner or beneficiary is entitled to payment. See 31 C.F.R.
§ 315.20 (a).
2o Cf. note 15 supra.
21 But see Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870 (1951), in which a court
concluded that the words "sole and absolute owner" leave no room for an equitable
interest, without acknowledging any limiting effect in the phrase "will be recognized
as . . .."
2 2 The court's conclusion that all the elements of a valid inter vivos gift were
established, including "complete control of the subject-matter of the gift," instant
case at 470k 170 A.2d at 359, is challenged by the provision of the regulations that
wvhen there is a surviving coowner or beneficiary, only he can compel payment, 31
C.F.R. §§ 315.61, .66 (1959). Several courts, in similar cases, have stated that a
putative donee who cannot cash bonds does not completely control them, even though
they are in his possession. See Collins v. Jordan, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 242, 110 N.E.2d
825 (C.P. 1949), appeal dismissed, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 253, 113 N.E2d 911 (Ct App.
1952); Brown v. Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W.2d 748 (1949). And an earlier
writer, accepting this theory, categorically asserted that "an inter vivos gift of [savings]
. . . bonds by the registered owner is, in fact, impossible." Note, supra note 4,
at 920. Perhaps the court was justified in passing over this objection because some
of the endorsed bonds had previously been cashed by a bank and honored by the
Treasury Department before the donor's death. Instant case at 467, 170 A.2d at 358.
Or it may have been satisfied by the donor's having surrendered whatever control
she possessed, since only with her brother's consent could the bonds have been
reissued with her husband's name substituted for that of her brother. See C.F.R.
§§ 315.60(a), .65(b) (1959). Of course, the donor could have cashed the bonds her-
self and delivered the proceeds to her husband. But her poor health, see instant case
at 466, 170 A.2d at 358, might have made it very difficult for her to comply with the
prescribed procedure for obtaining payment. See 31 C.F.R. § 315.38 (1959). _All
these factors may have influenced the court. Since the donee, by retaining possession
of endorsed bonds; established all of the elements of complete control which would
be necessary in a case involving only state law, and since these elements were originally
enunciated by state decisions which did not have to consider federal savings bonds
regulations preventing one in possession of bonds to obtain their proceeds directly,
it is questionable whether this disability should be allowed to vitiate an otherwise
valid inter vivos gift of bonds controlled by such regulations, especially when it is
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not seem to undermine the purpose of the Treasury's prohibition against
transfers. These regulations are aimed at simplifying the duties of the
Government in redeeming bonds and at saving it from involvement in suits
between claimants. This aim is clear in the provision for treating regis-
tration as conclusive of ownership,2 and in those provisions which refuse to
recognize judicial decisions as to inter vivos transfers 2 or to accept notices
of adverse claims or pending judicial proceedings.25  Another important
purpose of the Treasury regulations, little recognized by the courts, 26 is to
prevent the competition among government securities which might result
if savings bonds, with their higher rate of interest than most government
securities, could be easily transferred.2 7 Because the Treasury Department
cannot be forced by a state decision to redeem a bond for any person not
named on its face,28 the present decision will probably not increase either
the Treasury's duties in ascertaining whether a registered owner is entitled
to payment, or the possibility of the Government's becoming embroiled in
litigation over savings bonds. Nor does it seem probable that savings bonds
will now be more likely to pass into the hands of institutional investors, for
no court would be inclined to enforce an inter vivos "gift' of bonds to a
bank or other institutional investor; such a transfer would be viewed as
essentially a commercial transaction.
2 9
It is clear that in Pennsylvania the rights of a coowner or beneficiary
of a savings bond are thought to derive from a contract between the
Government and the purchaser, of which the coowner is a third-party
realized that, for other purposes, savings bonds must be treated as a type of personal
property sui generis. (Thus, although there is survivorship between coowners of
savings bonds, 31 C.F.R. §§315.61, .66 (1959), which is characteristic of a common-
law joint tenancy, 2 AmS.cAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1 (Casner ed. 1952), it is clear
that ownership of savings bonds is not a pure form of joint ownership, since one
coowner has the power at any time to terminate unilaterally and completely the
interest of the other coowner or the beneficiary by cashing the bonds. See 31 C.F.R.
§§315.60(a), .65(a) (1959). But cf. Byer v. Byer, 180 Kan. 258, 303 P.2d 137
(1956). This characteristic would seem to put joint ownership of savings bonds in
a class by itself, perhaps similar to that of joint bank accounts. See 2 AMERMcAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.4 (Casner ed. 1952) ; notes 31, 32 infra.) If other considerations
militate towards recognizing an attempted gratuitous transfer, the requirement that
the donee receive complete control of the subject matter of the gift should not be
applied dogmatically so as to prevent that result.
2 3 See 31 C.F.R. § 315.5 (1959).
24 See 31 C.F.R. §315.20(a) (1959).
25 See 31 C.F.R. § 315.20(b) (1959).
2 6 But see Connell v. Bauer, 240 Minn. 280, 295, 61 N.W.2d 177, 186 (1953).
27 The high yield, established to attract private investors, would induce institu-
tional investors to substitute savings bonds for their holdings of other government
bonds if this were possible. A provision that enables a holder of a money judgment
to obtain payment but not reissuance, 31 C.F.R. § 315.21 (1959), manifests an inten-
tion to prevent institutions such as banks from obtaining more bonds than the
limitations on holdings, 31 C.F.R. § 315.10 (1959), permit, as does a provision-with
certain exceptions-that bonds may not be hypothecated or pledged, 31 C.F.R. § 315.15
(1959). See generally 7 KAN. L. Rsv. 512 & n.5, 517 & n.45, 518 (1959).
28 See instant case at 468-69, 170 A.2d at 359.
2
9 If such a transfer were recognized, however, the risk of "competition" among
government securities might be seriously increased, since by employing a trust, ter-
minable at the bonds' maturity, in favor of an institutional "donee," the limitation on
holdings could be avoided. See 31 C.F.R. § 315.11(c) (2) (1959).
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beneficiary, rather than from a gift by the purchaser to the coowner of a
conditional right of survivorship.30 This theory fortunately obviated the
need to decide in the instant case how much evidence would be required
to negative the original intent of the purchaser to make a gift to the
coowner. 31  The sound policy of enabling persons of moderate means to
use survivorship provisions as a substitute for wills and administration
would be undermined if a purchaser's heirs could plunge the surviving
coowner into costly litigation in order to challenge the purchaser's original
donative intent.32 On the other hand, if a surviving coowner, as a third-
party beneficiary of a contract between the purchaser and the Government,
has a vested interest in the proceeds, the court should not be able to divest
that interest simply by reciting that the impact of the federal regulations
ends with payment. Savings bonds, however, differ from ordinary con-
tracts in that they give the donee beneficiary a right of survivorship only
on the condition that the purchaser die without having requested payment.
33
Although a purchaser (the promisee) probably could not release the
Treasury (the promisor) from its obligation to make payment to a
surviving coowner,3 4 the purchaser retains power to terminate all interest
of the donee beneficiary by cashing the bonds himself.35 If a coowner's
qualified right of survivorship is considered as vesting at purchase, it
remains subject at all times to complete divestment through cashing;
alternatively, the interest could be considered as vesting only upon the
occurrence of a condition precedent-the death of the purchaser before
payment is requested. Under either theory, the court in the present case, in
order to decide that the surviving coowner did not have a vested interest
30 Horstman Estate, 398 Pa. 506, 159 A.2d 514 (1960).
3 1 any courts apply the gift theory to survivorship rights in joint bank accounts
and permit evidence to be adduced to prove lack of donative intent. See, e.g., In the
Matter of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955) ; Cournoyer v. Monadnock
Say. Bank, 98 N.H. 385, 102 A.2d 910 (1953). However, even in these jurisdictions,
the gift theory is not automatically applied to rights of survivorship in savings bonds
registered in two names. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 76, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960),
Alexander v. Mermel, 27 Ill. App. 2d 281, 285-86, 169 N.E.2d 569, 572 (1960)
(dictum). Those courts which consider survivorship rights in joint bank accounts
as deriving from the contract between the bank and the depositor tend to bar, in the
absence of fraud, mistake, or undue influence, all evidence offered to show that the
parties did not intend to create rights of survivorship. See, e.g., Amour Estate,
397 Pa. 262, 154 A.2d 502 (1959) ; Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A.2d 85 (1953).
In the Pennsylvania cases cited, the signature cards unequivocally established rights
of survivorship. When the intent is less clear, there is still a rebuttable presumption
of an intent to create such an interest. See Fell Estate, 369 Pa. 597, 87 A.2d 310
(1952) ; Furjanick Estate, supra at 489-90, 100 A.2d at 88 (dictum).
32 Compare L. Jones, The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testa-
mentary Disposition of Property, 17 U. PITT. L. REv. 42 (1955) ; Kepner, The Joint
and Survivorship Bank Accaut-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L. REv.
596-97 (1953).
33 See 31 C.F.R §§ 315.61, .66 (1959). See generally 4 CoRgiN, CONTRACrS
§ 814, at 254-55 (1950). In considering survivorship, one must remember that no
ordinary joint tenancy relationship is created by the registration of savings bonds
in two names. See note 22 supra.
34 See generally 4 ConnxN, CONTRACTS § 814 (1950). Such discharge is possible
only by reissuance with the consent of the coowner. 31 C.F.R. § 315.60(b) (1959).
35 See note 22 supra.
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in the proceeds, perforce interpreted delivery of the endorsed bonds with
donative intent as a legal equivalent of cashing the bonds for purposes of
state contract law. Since the purchaser apparently believed that by giving
her husband endorsed bonds she was giving him the equivalent of cash,36
and since no purpose of the federal regulations is thwarted,37 the court
was justified in determining that her gift gave her husband an equitable
right to the proceeds.
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-PiaiNTFF
MAY NOT BE PEOLUDED F.Rom PROVING LIABiTY FOR FAURE To
FIn DETAMED PRETRIAL STATEMENT OF LEGAL TEoRIEs RELIED
'UPON
A long-protracted cigarettes-and-cancer suit in a federal district court
had been marked ready for trial when defendant's motion for pretrial
proceedings was granted. The district judge ordered plaintiff to submit a
"complete pre-trial statement," listing his "legal theory or theories of
recovery" and the facts he intended to prove in support of each theory.'
Plaintiff submitted a statement, but the district judge ruled that it failed to
set forth the claim with sufficient particularity, and ordered a new statement
remedying the points of deficiency raised by defendant. On defendant's
motion, plaintiff's second, third, and fourth statements were also ruled
insufficient for lack of particularity. Finally, the judge granted defendant's
motion for an order of preclusion,2 under which plaintiff was barred from
introducing at trial any evidence "on the issue of liability in either negli-
gence or breach of warranty" 3 -the only theories on which he was relying.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, divided two-to-one on the
36 Knowing that her husband would need money to pay her hospital expenses,
the decedent, in delivering the bonds, said: "I have the money; I want you to spend
it on me and do what you please with it." Instant case at 467, 170 A.2d at 358.
These circumstances-an unequivocal manual delivery accompanied by a verbal mani-
festation of intent, plus an endorsement serving to negative the possibility of fraud-
clearly tips the scale on which a court must weigh the two policies competing in any
provision for a "poor man's will": the need for reliable survivorship provisions which
may be used in lieu of formal wills as a means of avoiding costly administration,
litigation, and fraud; and the desire to effectuate a decedent's intention in changed
circumstances to terminate the interest of the original donee and make the proceeds
available to another.
37 See note 19 supra, notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.
I In addition the court required plaintiff to enumerate (1) the details of his
damages; (2) all proposed exhibits; (3) the names and addresses of all expert wit-
nesses, their field of specialization and the substance of their testimony; (4) the names
and addresses of all lay witnesses and the substance of their testimony; and (5)
whether he intended to seek further relief or discovery, and if so, what.
2 Padovani v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 27 F.R.D. 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
3 Plaintiff was also precluded from introducing at trial (1) any lay testimony
save that of himself and his wife; (2) any expert testimony; (3) any exhibits except
three named; (4) any evidence of damages, with four exceptions.
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proper grounds for its decision, granted plaintiff's petition for a writ of
mandamus ordering the district court to vacate the preclusion order and
continue with the proceedings. Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546
(2d Cir. 1961).
To aid in the conduct of the pretrial conferences permitted by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 some courts require the parties to submit
a written statement of their contentions.5 Failure to comply with this
requirement may result in dismissal on the merits,6 an order precluding
the introduction of certain evidence at trial,7 or the imposition of costs and
expenses.8 However, the problem of defining the limits on what a trial
judge may demand in these "pre-pretrial" written statements has rarely been
articulated.9 The crucial question raised by the disagreement between the
opinions in the instant case is whether written pretrial statements, although
coming at the pretrial rather than at the pleading stage, may not in reality
lead to a revival in modern guise of the worst elements of "special
pleading."
judge Clark, writing for the court, so characterized the written state-
ments demanded in the present case, saying that they reflected a consider-
able departure from the ideals of simplified pleading embodied in the
Federal Rules.10 judge Dawson, who concurred in vacating the preclusion
order on the ground that the trial court's directions had been too indefinite
to inform the plaintiff of what was required in the statements, dissented
vigorously from what he considered to be the majority's position-that a
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 16: "[T]he court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider [inter alia] . . . the
simplification of the issues . . . . The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference, . . . and the agreements made by the parties
* . . , and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or
agreements of counsel; and such order . . . controls the subsequent course of the
action. . . .. "
5 See, e.g., Local Rule 12 (D.D.C.), 4 FED. Ruims SzRv. 2d 1123 (1961) ; Local
Rule 9 (D.C. Alaska), 3 FED. Ruls SERV. 2d 1138 (1960) ; Pierro v. States Marine
Corp., 183 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See also Brennan, New Jersey Tackles
Court Congestion, 40 J. Am. Jun. Soc'y 45, 50 (1956) ; Shafer, Pre-Trial Conference
in Common Pleas Courts of Pennsylvania, 63 DICK. L. REv. 239 (1959).
6 Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1958),
aff'd, 266 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1959). This case, however, is grounded in part on plain-
tiff's failure to disclose his contentions with specificity at the conference as well as
in his written statements. See Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d
910 (2d Cir. 1959), where it is pointed out that rule 16 in itself confers no power
of dismissal not otherwise contemplated by the Rules. In order to dismiss for in-
sufficiency of the claim at pretrial, rule 56 (Summary Judgment) must be invoked.
Id. at 914 (dictum). In order to dismiss for noncompliance under rules 16 and 41(b),
there must be total failure to comply, or the attempted compliance must be "con-
tumacious." Id. at 914 (dictum).
7Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, stpra note 6.
8 Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
9 For an incisive analysis of the same problem in the context of discovery pro-
cedure, see James, The Revival of Bills of Particulars Under the Federal Rules, 71
H v. L. REv. 1473 (1958). See generally Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure,
17 OHio ST. L.J. 163, 168 (1957).
1 0 Instant case at 548-49.
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court may never order written pretrial statements setting forth facts and
theories of law." He said that often issues would be incapable of sim-
plification at pretrial if the court could not compel statements of theories
of recovery. Judge Clark, however, specifically declared that he was not
holding that a court may never request a pretrial statement to assist in
formulating the issues, but only that a "requirement of successive replead-
ings to force a plaintiff against his will to limit his case beyond the issues
he has tendered in his complaint" is unwarranted. 12 Judge Dawson
suggested that his colleague was unnecessarily confounding pretrial prob-
lems with problems of pleading.' 3 It is true, as Judge Dawson pointed
out, that pretrial ordinarily takes place after the pleadings are closed,
and is intended to define the issues with a greater degree of sharpness
than the pleadings do.14 Nevertheless, only consideration of the two
together will reveal whether the whole procedure preceding trial may be
falling prey to the same defects of special pleading which the Federal Rules,
through simplified forms, attempted to eliminate.
In the course of the instant case, in which over a year was consumed
in a paper battle before the parties ever reached the conference stage, the
resemblance to special pleading has been dramatic. The disadvantages of
that wasteful system for narrowing the issues have been thoroughly dis-
cussed and criticized: 15 It is often difficult for a party to determine exactly
what degree of specificity is demanded, and his adversary can compass
delay 16 and even outright dismissal '7 by objecting to his failure to observe
technical requirements. A party may feel it necessary to scatter a wide
range of detailed allegations, in the hope that at least one will achieve the
mark.18 If a party fails to include a particular claim which, now excluded,
becomes the only possible ground for recovery at trial, the court must face
the dilemma of whether to permit an injustice or to be liberal in allowing
11 Instant case at 551 (Dawson, J., dissenting in part).
12 Instant case at 550.
'3 Instant case at 551 (Dawson, J., dissenting in part).
14 See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 16.10, at 1115 (2d ed. 1948).
15 See generally Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. L.J. 177
(1958); Fee, Justice in Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 175, 182-89
(1949).
16 In Driefer v. Hershey Estates, Inc., 61 Dauph. 468 (Pa. C.P. 1951), a plaintiff
who had fallen in defendant hotel's bathtub alleged that defendant "maintained an
unsafe condition due to the slant and slope of the tub." The court granted defendant's
motion for a more specific complaint, saying: "All bathtubs 'slant' and all 'slope'.
Such an allegation is without value. If plaintiff expects to rely on the maintenance
of a defective tub he must specify precisely in what particulars the tub did not conform
to the normal tub." Id. at 469.
17 See, e.g., Kramer v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369, 279 S.W.
43 (1925), in which a telephone lineman, who had fallen when an iron spike on a
pole broke, charged in his complaint that the defendant "negligently caused said step
to be driven and placed in said pole not far enough to make it reasonably safe and
secure from breaking under a strain . . . ." Id. at 374-75, 279 S.W. at 43. The
court held that this failed to state a cause of action; plaintiff should have alleged
negligence in not maintaining the step at a greater length than 4'/ inches.
18 See Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 Wyo. LJ. 177, 183 (1958).
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amendment. The former course is clearly undesirable, but the latter not
only produces serious delay, but also undermines the very purpose of
requiring that claims be stated specifically.19 Judge Dawson agreed that
in the present case the plaintiff had been unable to submit a satisfactory
statement because the trial judge's directions were not made with "definite-
ness and precision," but he concluded that on remand a proper and helpful
statement could be secured under proper directions.20 Judge Clark, on the
other hand, suggested that the inability to give directions sufficiently precise
to apprise plaintiff of the specificity demanded is inherent in the nature of
any analogue of special pleading. Consequently, attempts to secure a more
satisfactory written statement should quickly be abandoned as futile and
resort be made to the very different pressures of the oral conference.21
Pretrial and discovery mechanisms were established in the Federal
Rules in order to simplify the issues raised by the pleading-a function
accomplished under the old system by the pleadings themselves.2 2 The
purpose of narrowing the issues is to inform both parties of the precise
limits of the dispute, so that only genuinely controverted issues will be
litigated, and so that a party will not be surprised at trial by an issue for
which he is not prepared2 3 Judge Dawson, worried about the need to
accomplish this purpose through clear statement of theories of recovery,
24
complained that under Judge Clark's view a party would not be forced to
disclose his legal theories until trial.2 5  But Judge Clark himself has ad-
mitted elsewhere that a pleading without a theory is a "meaningless
jumble." 26  Thus the difference of opinion in the present case actually
centered upon the definition and use of the term "theory."
19 James, supra note 9, at 1482-85; cf. Note, Variance From the Pre-Trial
Order, 60 YALE L.J. 175 (1951). Compare Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1953).
-0 Instant case at 553 (Dawson, J., dissenting in part).
2 1 Instant case at 548-49; cf. Church v. Adler, 305 Ill. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327
(1953), in which the court, reversing the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's second
amended complaint, observed that each subsequent complaint, although more lengthy,
was less informative than the one preceding it, and the parties would have been
spared considerable time and expense had the first complaint been accepted.
22 See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 16.10, at 1115 (2d ed. 1948).
23 See Fee, Justice in Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 175, 181 (1949).
24 This view is widely shared: "A lawsuit without a legal theory of claim and
also defense is 'Hamlet,' without Hamlet and without his uncle, the king, as well."
Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
48 CoLtm. L. REv. 491, 506 (1948).
25 Instant case at 552. He was apparently disturbed by judge Clark's emphatic
statement, bolstered by citation to Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d
974, 976 (2d Cir. 1945), that a pleader states facts and the court applies the law.
See instant case at 549.
2 6 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 265 (2d ed. 1947). Clark objects only to an overly
technical concept of theories which serves to harass a litigant and unduly restrict his
claim. Even the champions of theories of recovery do not want to revive the old
technicalities. In Johnson v. Geffen, 3 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 16.32, Case 6, at 287
(D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 1960) (dissenting opinion), Mr. Justice Reed, after declaring that
the issues must be limited at pretrial, continued: "This is not to resurrect the exces-
sive formalism of ancient pleading. Clarification, not entrapment, is the goal."
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There is a significant difference between a theory which is merely the
statement of the legal issue inherent in the facts presented,2 7 and the kind
of detailed statement and restatement of the claim required by the district
court in the present case. It would seem that the objectives of a pietrial
statement can be adequately achieved by a detailed statement of the facts
accompanied by a simple list of the legal issues. 28 This procedure informs
an opponent of the precise nature of the claim; it is not so loose a method
as to allow a remote contention to be later injected; and it avoids the waste-
ful technical pitfalls which history has demonstrated to be intrinsic in any
requirement of a detailed statement of legal theories.
While a proper pretrial statement can be a valuable aid in launching
the pretrial proceedings, the really constructive work of simplifying the
issues and identifying the areas of agreement and disagreement can best be
accomplished orally at the conference.2 9 Judge Clark suggested in his
opinion that success in formulating a pretrial order depends on the diligent,
tactful, and patient leadership of the judge, and these qualities can be best
brought to bear "in direct conference with the counsel, rather than by
arm's length examination of written statements." 30 Even in the "big case,"
where many writers think that the increased complexity demands greater
specificity in developing legal theories, 31 experience has shown that an oral
conference is more successful in simplifying the issues than repeated
written statements and counterstatements.
3 2
Judge Dawson claimed that the majority seemed to hold that a preclu-
sion order is never a valid sanction for failure to comply with an order at
pretrial. His concern is well-founded, for the success of pretrial depends
to a great extent on the cooperation of participating lawyers, and realisti-
27 Judge Clark pointed out that general pleading presents issues, and that it is
erroneous to believe that federal pleading is "notice pleading," which requires the
presentation of issues for the first time at pretrial. Instant case at 550-51.
28 For example, after his detailed statement of the facts, plaintiff might list the
legal issues as "negligence," "breach of express warranty," and "breach of implied
warranty." The defendant would be afforded notice of the issues to be raised, and
those issues would necessarily be limited by the facts. If, for example, the facts
recited make no mention of the defendanes manufacturing process, the theory that
defendant manufactured the cigarettes negligently would necessarily be excluded from
the claim. Cf. Taylor v. Reo Motors, Inc., 275 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1960). It is
important to remember that this statement is used only as an aid in the preparation
for and conduct of the pretrial conference; as such, it gives adequate notice. The
plaintiff might be willing, after the conference, to stipulate in the pretrial order that
a particular issue is abandoned. Compare Fernandez v. United Fruit Co., 200 F.2d
414 (2d Cir. 1952). Some courts require no more specification of the legal issue
than that suggested above even in the pretrial order. District Judge Christenson's
pretrial order merely calls for the statement of "the contested issues of law, in addi-
tion to those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact . . . ." Christenson, When Is
a Pre-Trial Conference a "Pre-Trial Conference"F, 23 F.R.D. 129, 136 (1958).
29 See Fee, Justice in Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 175, 199-202,
215-16 (1949).
30 Instant case at 550.
31 See Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on Procedure in Anti-Trust
and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 66-68 (1951). But see Clark, Special
Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957).
32 See statement by Mr. Kramer in A Clinical Discussion of Some Pre-Trial
Problems in Government Antitrust Cases, 21 F.R.D. 506, 508-09 (1957).
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cally this may require sanctions.33 The majority, however, expressly re-
jected the view that "an order of preclusion may never be appropriate." 3 4
A judge still retains adequate sanctions against recalcitrant counsel, in-
cluding preclusion orders,3 5 but in the present case such an order was
deemed to be a "drastic" penalty on a litigant for "what at most [was] an
error or dereliction of his lawyer," 36 especially since the requirement with
which the lawyer had failed to comply was of such doubtful validity. Judge
Dawson feared that "Judge Clark's theory of pre-trial would put the
calendar back a generation, so far as court administration is concerned." 
3 7
While the effect of pretrial procedures is an important question among
students of judicial administration,38 it is doubtful that Judge Dawson's
solution-to continue the same process which had proved futile after four
tries and had consumed more than a year's time-is the best remedy. The
ends of dispatch will be more effectively served by cutting the Gordian
knot of the insufficient "pre-pretrial" statement and proceeding to confer-
ence. The present case deserves attention for its forceful reminder by Judge
Clark that enthusiasm for pretrial should not blind judges to its proper
purpose and operation under the spirit of the Federal Rules and lead them
into an overly technical and coercive use of that valuable instrument.
INCOME TAX: DEDUCTIONS-STATE. TAXES ALLoCABLE TO
GAINs NOT RECOGNIZED JNDER SECTION 337 ARE DEDUCTIBLE,
SInCE SuCH GAIs ARE NOT "WHOLLY EXEMPT" FRoM TAXATION
A corporation, after adopting a plan of complete liquidation, realized a
gain on the sale of its assets. Although not recognized for federal income
tax purposes,1 this gain was subject to taxation by the Territory of
Hawaii. 2 On its federal income tax return, the corporation sought to
33 See LEvN & WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL
ADmINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 69 (1961), reporting the experience of Mont-
gomery County, Pennsylvania. There compulsory pretrial had to be abandoned; it
was felt that its failure was due in large measure to the absence of effective sanctions.
34 Instant case at 550.
35 See cases cited notes 6-8 supra.
S3 Instant case at 548.
3 7 1nstant case at 551.
38 Compare Kaufman, The Federal Riles: Control of the Human Equaio
Through Pre-Trial, 12 Wyo. L.J. 92 (1957) (acclaiming pretrial for helping sig-
nificantly in clearing crowded dockets), with ZEIsEL, KALvEW & BUCHHOLZ, DELAY
IN THE COURT 12, 154 (1959) (analyzing whether the judge time consumed in con-
ducting pretrials is offset by the time saved by diverting cases from trial and shorten-
ing those that do go to trial, and finding less cause for enthusiasm than did Judge
Kaufman). Compare LEVIN & WOOLLEY, op. cit. supra note 33, at 63-73.
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337.
2 This tax was assessed for 1955, when Hawaii's income tax law did not have
a nonrecognition provision like § 337 of the Federal Code. The current Hawaii
income tax law, generally incorporating the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, contains
such a provision. HAWAII REV. LAwS §§ 121-1, 121-25 (Supp. 1960).
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deduct the amount of the territorial tax from its gross income, relying on
section 164(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which permits
deductions for taxes paid during the year. The Government disallowed
the deduction, applying section 265 (1) of the Code, which denies deduction
of expenses allocable to income which is "wholly exempt" 3 from federal
taxation. The corporation paid the deficiency, sued for a refund, and was
ultimately sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,4 which
held the territorial taxes deductible on the ground that nonrecognized gains
are not "exempt" income within the meaning of section 265 (1). Hawaiian
Trust Co. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961).'
Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that if a
corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distributes all of its
assets within twelve months, it will not be taxed on any gain resulting
from the sale of its property during that period. This section was designed
to render inoperative the distinction which the courts had drawn between
sales by corporations and sales by shareholders pursuant to liquidation, 6 and
thereby to avoid double taxation-at the corporate and shareholder levels
-of gains which are realized when a corporation liquidates and disposes of
its property. 7 The deductibility under section 164(a) of whatever state
taxes a corporation must pay on gains derived from such sales hinges on
the applicability of section 265 (1),8 which in turn depends on the meaning
3The term "wholly exempt" is evidently used to contrast with "partially exempt."
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 35. For the purposes of simplification, "wholly exempt"
will hereinafter be referred to as "exempt."
4 Reversing Hawaiian Trust Co. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 637 (D. Hawaii
1959).
5 Accord, Bertha Gassie McDonald, 36 T.C. No. 109 (1961), in which the Tax
Court followed the instant case after Louisiana taxed gains resulting from a § 337
liquidation. Louisiana has since enacted a nonrecognition provision similar to that
of the Federal Code. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47:135(A) (Supp. 1960). However,
several states still tax these gains. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 380 (Supp. 1959) ;
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-152(f) (3) (A) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-2013
(1960) ; CAL. Rxv. & TAX CODE § 18031; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.14 (Supp. 1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3420b (Supp. 1960).
6 Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (if sale
of property is "in substance" by the corporation, profit on the sale must be reported
by the corporation), with United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451
(1950) (profit on sale of assets by the shareholder rather than by the corporation
is not part of corporate income).
7 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1954). Section 337 was passed
"in order to eliminate questions resulting only from formalities . . . ," id. at 39, or
"to provide 'a definitive rule which will eliminate any uncertainty' in determining
whether the sale was in fact made by the corporation or the shareholders," instant
case at 771. See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 289-90 (1959); STANLEY & KiLCULLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 144-46
(4th ed. 1961). See also note 33 infra and accompanying text
8 Although the court in the present case did not reach the issue of whether "taxes"
are "expenses" under § 265 (1), it seems clear that taxes are encompassed by that
section. Both §265(1) and its counterpart under the 1939 Code, §24(a) (5), ch. 1,
53 Stat. 16, deny deductions to "any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction
which is allocable to one or more classes of income . . . wholly exempt from
the taxes imposed by this subtitle . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Taxes are deductions
allowed by § 164. The Tax Court consistently applied § 24(a) (5) of the 1939 Code
to taxes, see Mary A. Marsman, 18 T.C. 1 (1952), aff'd on other grounds, 205 F.2d
335 (4th Cir. 1953), acq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2; George W. P. Heffelfinger, 5 T.C. 985
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in that section of income "exempt" from federal taxation. The court
in the instant case relied on Cotton States Fertilizer Co.,9 in which the
Tax Court allowed a deduction of expenses incurred in presenting a fire
insurance claim, even though the insurance award itself, which was used
to replace destroyed property, was not taxable,"' but would be reflected in
the tax due when the rebuilt property was sold.1 ' The Tax Court con-
cluded that nonrecognized gains arising from involuntary conversions are
not exempt income within the meaning of section 24(a) (5) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 193912 (now section 265(1) of the 1954 Code).13
The court in the present case erred when it categorically treated
"nonrecognized gain" and "exempt income" as mutually exclusive terms.14
First: "Income" and "gain" are accounting designations which do not
necessarily represent different kinds of increments to a business. To some
accountants, "income" is the more general category,' 5 comprising operating
(1945); James F. Curtis, 3 T.C. 648 (1944); Laurence B. Halleran, 11 P-H
B.T.A.-T.C. Mere. Dec. 1143 (1942), although only in Laurence B. Halleran, supra
at 1150, was the issue discussed. The heading "expenses" was added to the section
in the 1954 Code, but the legislative history clearly shows that there was no intention
to change the existing law. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A65 (1954).
Moreover, "taxes" and "expenses" are not mutually exclusive terms, since taxes which
are not deductible under § 164-such as the federal tax on telegraph messages-may
be deductible under § 162 ("Trade or Business Expenses") or § 212 ("Expenses for
Production of Income"). Treas. Reg. § 1.164-3 (1957) ; P-H 1962 FED. TAx HAND-
BOOK 181 (1961). The main reason for placing taxes in a separate section seems to
be to allow for their deduction in full when they are allocable to capital gains, rather
than simply to permit a reduction of that gain. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (a) (1958).
Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 162, 212, with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001,
1012, 1016. The corporation, in the instant case, argued that since § 164 allows the
deduction of taxes not associated with any income, it would be illogical to disallow the
deduction of taxes allocable to exempt income. Brief for Appellant, p. 82. But this
argument ignores the striking analogy to § 163, which clearly makes interest on
indebtedness deductible without regard to whether it is associated with the production
of income, while § 265(2) expressly disallows the deduction of all interest incurred
on indebtedness used to carry tax exempt obligations. It is not inconsistent to conclude
that Congress has decided to allow the deduction of interest and taxes where they relate
to the personal expenses of the taxpayer, but not where they are allocable to the
production of nontaxable income.
928 T.C. 1169 (1957), acq., 1958-1 Cumr. BULL. 4.
10Under § 112(f) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, as amended in 1951, no gain is
recognized on an involuntary conversion of property into money, when that money
is used to purchase "other property similar or related in service or use to the property
so converted . . . ." Ch. 1, 53 Stat. 39, as amended, ch. 661, 65 Stat. 734 (1951)
(now INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 1033 (a)).
11 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 113 (a) (9), 53 Stat. 42 (now INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 1033(a)). But cf. note 25 infra.
12 Ch. 1, 53 Stat. 16.
13 Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 28 T.C. 1169, 1172-73 (1957), acq., 1958-1 Cum.
BuLL. 4.
14 For example, where the court said: "There is a valid distinction between
'wholly exempt' income and income on which 'no gain or loss is recognized." In-
stant case at 773. See, in support of this position, MacLean, Taxation of Sales of
Corporate Assets in the Course of Liquidation, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 641, 672 n.92 (1956).
15 "Income is the monetary gain derived from the use of capital, or labor, or
both. Income includes profit derived from sales of products or services or conversions
of capital assets." HOLMEs, MAYNARD, EDWARDS, & MmER, INTERmEDIATE AccOUNT-
ING 634 (1958). Both revenue from the ordinary operations of the business and
realized gains that are not the result of planned activities "comprise, in a broad sense,
the income . . . of the business.' KsTER, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 80 (1946).
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income and nonoperating income. The latter class is illustrated by gains
resulting from extraordinary transactions in capital assets.16 Moreover,
the 1954 Code specifically provides that "gross income" includes "gains
derived from dealings in property." 17 Thus, any distinction between "non-
recognized gain" and "exempt income" must look to the qualifying words
"nonrecognized" and "exempt." Second: Since the Code does not define
these words, a definition can be formulated only by examining the operative
effect of the words on taxable income, or the kinds of transactions to which
the words are applied by the Code. The first approach leads nowhere.
Adopting the court's premise that "exempt income" is is that which is not
included in "gross income," 19 there is no tax difference between an item
classified as "exempt income" and a "nonrecognized gain" under section
337, as shown by the following illustrations.
(1) Corporation A, with assets of $10,000 and outstanding stock
of $10,000, receives a $2,000 gift. Under section 102 of the Code,
this $2,000 is excluded from gross income, and therefore not taxable
to the corporation. Corporation A is then liquidated, and the $12,000
According to Professors Surrey and Warren, a "precise definition of 'income' in a
single phrase is not attainable . . . ." Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project
of the American Law Institute: Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and
Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66 HAgv. L. REV. 761, 771 (1953).
16 HoLmrs & Mziz, ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 304 (1950).
1 7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (3).
18It is obvious that §265(1), in referring to income "wholly exempt" from
taxation, is not limited to income which is so designated, for only one other section
of the Code refers to "wholly exempt" income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103 (inter-
est on certain governmental obligations). When the predecessor of § 265(1) was
first enacted, see note 28 infra, a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee reported:
[I]nterest on State securities, salaries received by State employees, and
income from leases of State school lands are exempt from the Federal in-
come tax. It is obviously improper to allow any deduction for expenses
incurred in the production or acquirement of such income. Accordingly,
our subcommittee recommends that a provision be inserted in the law specifi-
cally denying deductions allocable to such classes of income.
Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1934). The Tax Court, however, has refused to restrict
the application of the provision to these classes of income. See George W. P. Heffel-
finger, 5 T.C. 985, 989-90 (1945). Therefore, §265(1) must apply at least to those
items which are referred to as "exemptions" and are specifically excluded from "gross
income" in § 101-121. See note 19 infra. The Tax Court, consistent with this
broader view, has disallowed deduction of expenses allocable to the following items
of exempt income: certain notarial fees, James F. Curtis, 3 T.C. 648 (1944) ; edu-
cational income provided by the Veterans Administration, Ephraim Banks, 17 T.C.
1386, 1393 (1952), see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 121(a) (18), added by 71 Stat. 160
(1957), as amended, 72 Stat. 1266 (1958) ; and proceeds from life insurance policies,
Donald B. Jones, 25 T.C. 4 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1956), see INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (1).
19 Instant case at 772. See P-H 1962 FED. TAx HANDBoox 53 (1961) : "Exempt
items are excluded from gross income and are commonly called exchsions (Sec. 101
et seq.) ." But see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 35 (3% of certain tax-exempt interest
allowed as a credit against tax), § 151 (personal exemptions deducted from gross
income).
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($10,000 + $2,000) worth of assets distributed to its shareholders.
Notwithstanding that the $2,000 gift was tax-exempt, the shareholders
will be taxed on the full $12,000.20
(2) Corporation B has assets with a basis of $10,000 and out-
standing stock in the amount of $10,000. It adopts a plan of liquida-
tion, sells the assets for $12,000, and distributes that amount to its
shareholders, all within a year's time. Pursuant to section 337, the
$2,000 gain on the sale is not recognized to Corporation B, and there-
fore the corporation is not taxed on it.2 1 Corporation B's shareholders,
however, are taxed on the $12,000, just as Corporation A's share-
holders were.
In both instances, the $2,000 increment is taxed to the shareholders and
not to the corporation. Consequently, if a valid distinction is to be drawn
between "exempt income" and "nonrecognized gain" for the purpose of
section 265(1), one must take the second approach and look for some
substantive difference between the kinds of transactions to which the terms
apply.
In the Revenue Act of 1934,22 in which what is now section 265(1)
first appeared,2 3 the income tax provisions provided for the nonrecognition'
of one primary class of gain, namely, gains resulting from certain exchanges
of property for property, stock for stock, and property for stock.2 4  Gains
of this sort are ordinarily 2 5 taxed in a future tax period, there being a
postponement of the tax until the gains resulting from what is merely a
change in form 2 6 are converted into a different kind of asset-usually cash
or its equivalent. Almost all of the other nonrecognition provisions which
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 331.
21 Contrary to the court's indication, instant case at 772, the § 337 gains are
excluded from "gross income" at the time the transaction occurs. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-6(b) (1957).
22 Ch. 277, 48 Stat 680.
2 3 Internal Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 24(a) (5), 48 Stat. 691.
24 The only other class of nonrecognized gain in the 1934 act was "involuntary
conversions." See note 10 .rupra. These nonrecognition provisions are located
in §§ 112(b), 112(f) of the Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 704, 705. These
same sections, with the addition of similar nonrecognition provisions, were incor-
porated into Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 112(b), (f), 53 Stat 37.
25 If a taxpayer realizes a nonrecognized gain from the involuntary conversion
of a building and dies without disposing of the property, the heir or devisee who
acquires the property will not be taxed on this gain, since his basis will be the fair
market value of the property at the date of the decedent's death. Thus, this gain
will never be taxed. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1033, 1014(a) (formerly Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 112(f), 113(a) (5), 53 Stat. 39, 41).
26 Sections 1033 and 1034, relating to involuntary conversions and the sale of a
residence pursuant to the purchase of a new residence, do not recognize any resulting
gain, even though the taxpayer may receive cash in the course of the transaction.
The theory behind the nonrecognition of these gains is "that the new property is
substantially a continuation of the old investment . . . ." P-H 1962 FED. TAX
HANDBOOK 93 (1961).
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have been added to the income tax laws from time to time likewise simply
shift the tax to a future, more convenient time for the taxpayer 27 But
section 337, enacted for the first time in the 1954 Code, provides for non-
recognition of a substantially different type of gain. This section does not
postpone the tax, since the corporation is liquidated in the same year in
which the gain is realized; rather, it effectively provides that the gain shall
never be taxed to the corporate taxpayer. Although the shareholder is
taxed on the gains described in section 337, that tax would be levied whether
or not the corporation were taxed. In contrast, under the other non-
recognition provisions, the income is taxed in the future only because it
was not taxed when the gain was first realized. Moreover, a section 337
gain is not a mere change of form; it more nearly resembles regular income
arising from the normal operations of a business---except for its infrequency
of occurrence. The result is that although a valid distinction might be
drawn between change-of-form gains resulting from the exchange of stock
or property, on which a tax will eventually be paid, and those items which
the Code states are not included in "gross income," to carry the distinction
over and consequently permit the deduction of expenses related to a non-
change-of-form gain resulting from the sale of property under section 337,
on which no tax will ever be paid by the taxpayer claiming the deduction,
is to ignore the purpose of section 265(1) to prevent taxable income from
being diminished by expenses attributable to nontaxable income.
28
Although it might be argued that the nexus between the corporation
and the shareholders is sufficiently close to warrant treating them as a
27As codified in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, these provisions are: 8311 (distribution
by a corporation, with respect to its stock, of stock or property); § 332 (receipt by
a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation);
§ 336 (distribution by a corporation of property in partial or complete liquidation);
§ 351 (certain transfers of property to a corporation in exchange for stock or securities
in the corporation); § 354 (exchange of stock in certain reorganizations); § 355
(distribution of stock of a controlled corporation to the shareholders); § 361 (ex-
changes of property for stock in certain reorganizations); § 371 (exchanges of
property for stock pursuant to reorganization in certain receivership and bankruptcy
proceedings); § 373 (railroad reorganizations); § 643 (relating to estates, trusts,
and beneficiaries); § 721 (contribution of property to a partnership in exchange for
an interest in the partnership); § 731(b) (distribution to a partner of property);
§ 803 (relating to lif& insurance companies) ; § 1031 (a) (exchanges solely in kind of
property held for productive uses or investment); § 1032 (receipt of property in
exchange for stock of that corporation); § 1033 (a) (involuntary conversions);
§ 1034(a) (sale and purchase, or exchange of residence); § 1035 (a) (exchange of
insurance policies) ; § 1036(a) (exchange of a corporation's stock solely for stock of
the same corporation); § 1071 (sale or exchange to effectuate the policies of the
FCC); § 1081 (exchange or distributions in obedience to orders of the SEC);
8 1332(b) (certain war loss recoveries).
28 "The primary purpose of the [Revenue Act of 1934] . . . is to increase the
revenue by preventing tax avoidance." H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1934). Pursuant to this policy, § 24(a) (5) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 265 (1))
was adopted for the purpose of eliminating "as deductions from gross income expenses
allocable to the production of income wholly exempt from the income tax." H.R.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1934). In James F. Curtis, 3 T.C. 648, 651
(1944), the Tax Court stated that § 24(a) (5) "is susceptible of only one sensible
interpretation, namely, that a taxpayer is allowed no deduction for expenditures which
are allocable to income that is nontaxable for whatever reason." But see Maclean,
supra note 14, at 672 n.92.
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single taxable entity, thereby preventing the application of section 265(1),
an analysis of the Internal Revenue Code indicates that when Congress
has desired to disregard corporate existence in order to aid the taxpayer,
it has done so explicitly and without ambiguity. Section 337 itself, which
"was enacted to avoid double taxation at both the corporate and share-
holder levels ... ,, 29 is a good example, as are section 1372, which
permits certain small business corporations to be taxed similarly to partner-
ships,30 and section 311, which provides for nonrecognition of any gain to
a corporation resulting from the appreciation of property distributed as
dividends.31 But there is no indication that Congress similarly intended to
pierce the corporate veil under section 265 (1).32 Nor is there any reason
to merge the corporation-taxpayer with the shareholder-taxpayer in section
265(1) on the ground that section 337, to some extent, does look through
the corporation. For section 337 is carefully limited to certain kinds of
property 33 and does not permit the pass-through of losses.34  It provides
no basis for attributing to Congress an intent to pierce the corporate veil
in other respects.
29 Instant case at 771.
30 The purpose of this provision is to aid small business by taxing the corporation's
income to shareholders who may be in a lower tax bracket than the corporation, and
to permit shareholders of corporations to offset corporate losses against their other
income. Biica, op. cit. mupra note 7, at 402.
31 See generally BrrrnEa, op. cit. supra note 7, at 153-59. See also § 332 which
provides, if certain conditions are met, that "no gain or loss shall be recognized on
the receipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another
corporation." Congress hoped that the "elimination of the corporate veil" between
parent and subsidiary would encourage "the simplification of complex corporate
financial structures by permitting the liquidation of unnecessary subsidiaries without
recognition of gain." BIrTKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 272-73. Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 34, 116.
3 2 When § 24(a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1934 was passed by the House of
Representatives, it referred to "income wholly exempt to the taxpayer . . ."; but
the Senate deleted the phrase "to the taxpayer" and the Conference Committee
acceded. SEIDMAN, LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws-1938-
1861, at 315 (1938). Section 22(b) (4) of the 1934 act, ch. 277, 48 Stat 687, con-
cerning tax-exempt interest, also contained the phrase "to the taxpayer" when passed
by the House. This was similarly deleted by the Senate, the reason for the removal
being articulated as follows: "Moreover, the expression 'exempt to the taxpayer' in
section 22(b) (4) of the House bill, is not entirely clear and was the cause of the
ambiguity complained of in the existing law. It is difficult to think of gross income
in the light of its exemption to the taxpayer. To carry out this policy of your com-
mittee, changes have also been made in [other] sections . . . ." SEIDMAN, Mupra
at 300. Although this does not clarify the reasons for the deletion, it is clear that its
purpose was not to define "wholly exempt" with respect to the income and in disregard
of the particular taxpayer.
33 Section 337 does not apply to property such as inventory or to certain install-
ment obligations. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 337(b).
34 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337(a). There is no indication of the reason
for this limitation. Since § 337 is not elective, it may result in denying a deduction
for a loss in circumstances where the shareholders did not intend to avoid Commis-
sioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In such a situation, however,
"the corporation may be able to avoid the applicability of § 337(a), by making the
sale before adopting the plan of liquidation." BrrKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 291-92.
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LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS-SEIORITY RIGHTs
HELD To S.RvivE TERMINATION OF ONTRACT AND To BE TRANS-
IFERABLE TO EMPLOYER'S NEw PLANT
Under the seniority clause in a collective bargaining agreement, any
worker with seniority was guaranteed reinstatement within three years
after any layoff. The agreement did not stipulate procedures to be
followed in case the employer should close its plant and move to another
place. When the agreement expired, the employer discharged its workers
and moved from Long Island to a new factory in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,
where it continued to manufacture many of the same products it had made
at the old plant. Several former employees demanded "reinstatement"
with seniority at the new plant, but the employer refused them jobs on
any other basis than as new applicants. After an abortive attempt at
arbitration,' the former employees, alleging breach of the seniority clause
of the agreement, brought an action for damages in a federal district court.
2
The court denied relief,3 but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, holding in a two-to-one decision that the seniority rights had been
earned "by compliance with the terms of the contract," were therefore
"vested," and "could not be unilaterally annulled by the good faith move
of the factory to another city." 4 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 368 U.S. 814 (1961) (No. 242). 5
The present case involved the difficult problem of construing a contract
by implication to meet a contingency for which it did not provide in
express terms. The courts have utilized two methods to fill such gaps-
the effectuation of the parties' intentions where literal enforcement of the
express terms would work an inequity,6 and the imposition of contractual
terms as a requirement of public policy.7 Collective bargaining agreements,
I A. New York court sustaitied the company's motion to stay arbitration on the
ground that the agreement required arbitration only of disputes arising out of its
"specific" terms. In the Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700,
172 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
2 jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship.
3The district court assumed the affirmative of the question deemed crucial by
the court of appeals-whether plaintiffs' seniority rights had survived the expiration
of the agreement-and then construed the language of the agreement as barring the
transfer of these rights from one plant to another. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185 F.
Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
4 Accord, Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961),
citing and following the instant case.
5Limited to the question: "Does participation by a Court of Claims judge [in
this case, Madden, J., who wrote the majority opinion] vitiate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals?"
6.An example is the law of "time of the essence" contracts. See, e.g., Beck &
Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 52 Fed. 700 (8th Cir.
1892); RESTATmFENT, CoNTRAcTs § 276 (1932).
7Typical of this type of construction is the implied "agreement" not to interfere
with the performance of a contract. See, e.g., Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96,
97 N.E. 472 (1912) ; RESTATEMMNT, CoNTRAcTS § 315 (1932).
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because of their unique "governmental" nature s inevitably fail to provide
for many of the disputes which arise as to the relative rights of labor and
management under them.9 The need to resolve such disputes equitably has
been met by a number of modifications of the "ordinary" rules of contract
law as applied to labor agreements.' 0 Typical of these modifications and
a natural response to the quality of a labor agreement as a continuing
relationship, subject to periodic modifications," is the extension of certain
rights established by the agreement beyond its date of termination. Courts
have enforced claims of rights to vacation pay,12 retirement pay,13 and
severance pay 14-despite the absence of such claims before the expiration
of the contract-by holding that the employer could not have intended
that rights earned by compliance with the contract should go unfunded.15
To refuse to require an employer to make good on such future compensation
would permit him to avoid unilaterally part of the consideration for labor
received which was clearly contemplated by both parties on entering the
collective agreement.
Seniority rights have been described as a present recognition of status
given in exchange for present labor.16 Perhaps for this reason courts have
hesitated to accord the same protection to seniority rights as to deferred
benefits, despite the fact that to employees seniority is one of the most
important security provisions in the collective bargaining agreement.17 By
8 See Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MicH.
L. REv. 1 (1958).
9Id. at 25. Ordinarily, the problems which arise are solved by arbitration. In
that solution there is great latitude for creativity in construction of the contract.
Id. at 25-28. When, however, as in the instant case, the arbitration clause in the
contract is so limited that an arbitrator is given no jurisdiction to settle grievances not
arising from the express terms of the contract, the solution must be sought from the
courts. Cf. In the Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
' 0 Eminent writers disagree as to the necessity or desirability of this evolution.
Compare Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv.
999, 1002-05 (1955) (pro), with Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 475-76
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contra).
11 See Botany Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers, 50 N.J. Super. 18, 29, 141 A.2d
107, 113 (App. Div. 1958) (dictum).
'12 n re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940) ; In the Matter of
The Brooklyn Citizen, 1 Misc. 2d 162, 90 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Textile
Workers v. Brookside Mills, Inc., 203 Tenn. 71, 309 S.W.2d 371 (1957). But cf.
Treloar v. Steggeman, 333 Mich. 166, 52 N.W.2d 647 (1952), in which the court
held that pension rights had not vested because they had not been earned at the time
the employer closed his business.
13 Mencher v. Weiss, 306 N.Y. 1, 114 N.E.2d 177 (1953) ; New York City Omni-
bus Corp. v. Quill, 189 Misc. 892, 73 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y.
832, 78 N.E2d 859 (1948).
14 Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956); In the
Matter of The Brooklyn Citizen, 1 Misc. 2d 162, 90 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
accord, In re Brooklyn Eagle, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 156 (1959).
15 See cases cited notes 12-14 mepra; Note, Termination of Collective Bargaining
Agreements-Survival of Earned Rights, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 646 (1959).
'6 61 CoLim. L. REv. 1363, 1367 (1961).
17 See Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements,
6 U. CH. L. REv. 651 (1939).
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saying that seniority is not "inherent" in the employment relationship and
can arise only where expressly created by contract, the courts have
enunciated a formal rule that seniority rights are contingent upon the
contract creating them and are therefore extinguished upon termination
of that contract.' 8
The court in the present case purported to interpret the contract
according to the intentions of the parties and their "reasonable expecta-
tions." 19 In so doing, it assigned particular significance to defendant's
voluntary recognition of its former employees' rights to retirement bene-
fits.2 0 Analogizing from retirement benefits to seniority rights on the
ground that both are facets of the consideration given by the employer for
the employees' services, the court found in the company's treatment of
retirement benefits an implied willingness to recognize the validity of all
of the security interests which had accrued to the employees under the
contract. In so doing, the court seems to have assumed its conclusion,
ignoring the fact that the defendant had refused to recognize the con-
tinuance of the employees' interests in its welfare plan and its group in-
surance plan,2 1 from which it might well have inferred that the defendant's
intention was to recognize no more of the employees' security interests
than was required by law. It is not surprising that the employer "volun-
tarily" recognized retirement pay rights; the courts have been uniform in
upholding the continuation of these rights after the contract which created
them has ended.22 It is doubtful that the court correctly interpreted the
employer's actual intentions; it would appear rather that the court, un-
willing to accept the distinction made in earlier cases between seniority
rights and other security interests, 23 introduced an "implied" clause into the
contract in order to correct what it thought to be an inequitable situation
18 Often cited as the leading case is System Fed'n 59, Ry. Employees Dep't v.
Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
In this case the employer had abrogated a collective bargaining agreement. But
before suit was brought, the union negotiated a new agreement creating a new seniority
scale and recognizing the validity of the abrogation of the old contract. The case
is therefore similar to the cases in which the power of a union to contract with the
employer in such a way as to destroy or diminish seniority rights has been challenged.
This power has been uniformly upheld by the courts on the basis that the employee
has placed full authority in his bargaining agent to make contracts binding upon him.
See Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945); Goodin v. Clinch-
field R.R., 125 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956); O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491,
107 N.W.2d 484 (1961). These cases are quite different from the instant ease in
which the rights were terminated unilaterally. Local Lodge 2040, IAM v. Servel,
Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), the prior case most
nearly on point with the instant case, involved a sale of the plant in which the em-
ployees worked, rather than a transfer of the manufacturing operation from one
location to another. The jobs had thus ceased to exist, and plaintiffs' action for a
declaratory judgment that the collective bargaining agreement was still in force was
dismissed.
19 Instant case at 104.
20 Instant case at 103.
21 See Appendix to Appellee's (Defendant's) Memorandum, p. 6a.
22 See cases cited note 13 supra; Note, supra note 15.
23 See cases cited in notes 12-14 supra; Note, supra note 15.
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brought about by the employer's unilateral termination of the continuing
employment relationship.24 Although this "construction" of the contract
may appear arbitrary, there are sound reasons for the result.
Unlike courts in prior cases, the majority in the present case con-
sidered seniority chiefly as a guarantee of security. It recognized that the
primary function of seniority is to provide an orderly and standardized
procedure for layoff and recall in order to prevent the employer from being
arbitrary or partial.25 That other procedures are often keyed to the
seniority system should not be allowed to conceal the fact that the basic
reason for its existence is to provide against future industrial vicissitudes
by protecting workers with the longest terms of service. Seniority has
been called the "best kind of unemployment insurance," 26 a phrase which
reflects the fact that it is essentially a present provision for a future
contingency. Probably the security provided by seniority is often more
important to the worker than those "vested" security rights which the courts
have been willing to protect by reading an intention that they survive into
a terminated contract.27 By stressing the security aspect of seniority, the
court in the present case underlined seniority's close kinship with those
types of security interests which have been protected, and paved the way
for its analogous treatment. Rights to vacation pay, severance pay, and
pensions depend just as much for their existence upon creation in the col-
lective bargaining agreement as do seniority rights, and they are no more
"inherent" in the employment relationship.28 Furthermore, a theory which
treats these "vested" rights as an element of the consideration owed by the
employer to the employee in exchange for his services is equally applicable
to seniority rights.
The peculiar problem which has probably caused the courts' failure
to preserve seniority rights heretofore is that, while seniority confers
future benefits in return for present labor, it is also a present status which
may be made the basis of present benefits such as shift scheduling and
promotions.2 9 In this aspect it resembles regular wages, which clearly
would not survive termination of a contract without specific provision. The
24 Having determined that the plaintiffs' seniority rights had outlived the contract,
the court then demolished defendants contention that the rights were confined to
the old plant by pointing out that if such a distinction were accepted, an employer
could destroy all of its employees' security interests simply by moving one street
away from its present location. The trial court had based its decision for defendant
on such a geographic limitation of plaintiffs' rights, and in so holding it ultimately
did defendant a disservice, for its reasoning was exposed to the obvious reductio ad
absurdumn which the court of appeals used. Instant case at 103-04. The defendant
would have been on much firmer ground in the court of appeals if the trial judge's
strict construction of the contract had focused on the temporal limitation on seniority
rights rather than on their geographic confinement.
2 5 See WoLLEnT & AAaox, LABOR RELATEONS AND THE LAW 603 (1960).
26 Pipin, supra note 17, at 658.
27 See cases cited notes 12-14 .s'pra; Note, supra note 15.
28 See instant case at 103.
29 See CHAmBERLAmN, THE UNIoN CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 81, 270
(1948).
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problem is complicated by the fact that workers such as those in the present
case, discharged at the end of a contract, are usually seeking recognition
not of the traditional future benefit of seniority-preferential rehiring-but
rather a continuation of the prior seniority structure which makes such
preferences as to layoff and rehiring possible. Moreover, in contrast with
vacation pay and pensions, the continued enjoyment of the security bene-
fits of seniority is contingent upon the maintenance of the employment
relationship. Thus the enforcement of seniority status represents a limita-
tion upon the right of management to control the composition of its
working force to the extent that it compels the continued employment of
certain workers. That the seniority structure involved in the present case
provided only for future rehiring security no doubt helped the court to reach
its ground-breaking result.30 It would appear that courts in the past,
in refusing to recognize the survival of seniority rights as rights earned by
compliance with the contract during its existence, placed greater emphasis
upon the day-to-day benefits of seniority and upon its managerial function,
all of which terminate with the employment relationship, than upon its
role of providing future security.
Perhaps because of an awareness of the important part played by
policy considerations in its construction of the contract, the court was
careful to limit its holding to the facts before it. It held only that when
the seniority clause of a collective bargaining agreement states that the
right to reinstatement exists for a period extending beyond the term of the
agreement, the security rights created by that clause implicitly survive the
termination of the contract for the duration of that period, and the com-
pany, when it moves, is bound to provide an opportunity for reemployment
to those who are protected by the clause.3 1 If the worker elects not to
take this opportunity, then he in effect waives his right to seniority and
cannot bring an action upon it.3 2  The court was careful not to set a
monetary value on the security provided by seniority rights. Had it gone,
further, the impact upon a company desiring to move might well have
been to require it to compensate every senior employee for the value-
assuming such value is ascertainable--of his seniority status. Such a rule
would create a severe restriction upon a company's management
prerogative to move at will,3 3 and might render a prospective move
30 See the collective bargaining agreement quoted in full in Appendix to Appellee's
Memorandum, pp. 20a-0a.
31 Instant case at 103.
32 Instant case at 104.
33 See Local 586, UAW v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 36 L.R.R.M. 2357 (D.C.
Conn. 1955); Paul v. Mencher, 169 Misc. 657, 7 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct 1937), aff'd,
254 App. Div. 851, 6 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1938). There are, of course, statutory and
sometimes contractual limitations on the exercise of this prerogative. See United
Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd in
part and re7/d in part, 49 L.R.RM. 2346 (3d Cir. 1962) (compensatory punitive
damages for breach of contract not to move) ; Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162
Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (specific performance of contract not
to move); 53 MicH. L. Rv. 627 (1955) (NLRB remedies where the move is an
unfair labor practice).
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unfeasible.34 In the instant case, the court held that the employees were
entitled to damages solely to compensate them for the employer's breach of
his contractual duty to reinstate them and not to compensate for their loss
of seniority itself. This decision would not seem to create any prejudice to
the interests of the moving firm to which a court would be likely to give
weight. It only obliges the employer to offer reemployment to its former
employees instead of hiring new ones.3 5 Although these men may provide
a core of union-oriented labor in the new installation and select the same
or a similar bargaining agent with which the firm must deal, if the com-
pany moved to escape its labor problems, there is no reason why it should
be permitted to destroy a right which the employees earned through
performance of their contract.3 6 If, on the other hand, a company moves
for reasons unrelated to its labor relations, it should hardly object to being
required to offer work to experienced workmen familiar with its operations.
34 See generally Firns That Run Away, 200 THE: EcONOMIST 986 (1961), com-
menting on the instant case and Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 195 F. Supp. 826
(E.D. Mich. 1961). See also Gordon & McCorry, Plant Relocation alld Job Security:
A Case Study, 11 INn. & LAB. RYxL. Rav. 13 (1957), in which the authors examine the
factors involved in an employee's decision to "follow the work" when a plant transfers
to another area.
A rule that the company must compensate its senior employees whenever it
closes its plant would also raise serious problems for a company going out of business
altogether. The burden would be particularly severe if the company discontinued
operations due to financial failure. Wagner v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
41 Wash. 2d 306, 248 P2d 1084 (1952), held that the seniority rights there involved
were not so tangible that they could be enforced when the employer was no longer a
going concern and therefore was incapable of according the employees their con-
tractual rights. In basing its decision on the incapability of the employer to perform
under the contract, the court implied that when capability does exist, the employer is
bound by the contract to offer reinstatement to its senior employees. See id. at 309,
248 P.2d at 1085; cf. Local Lodge 2040, IAM v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
35 The court recognized but did not discuss the problem of an employer with
several plants who wants to consolidate all of his operations into one plant. Instant
case at 104. The employer, in order to avoid a lawsuit, must permit senior employees
to transfer to the surviving plant where the working force may already be represented
by a bargaining agent. The employer's attempt to insinuate those employees who
elect to move into an existing seniority structure might well raise serious labor
relations problems, especially if the union in the surviving plant, having read the
instant case, has managed to force an agreement that workers may not be brought
in from the employer's other plants at senior levels. The prevention or resolution of
this kind of conflict-in which the employer is bound to violate one contract or the
other as soon as he decides to consolidate-may require a kind of industrial states-
manship which it is unrealistic to expect. See Torff, The Trend of the Collective
Bargaining Process-An Objective Appraisal, 12 LAB. L.J. 314 (1961). On the other
hand, in the case of corporate mergers, unions and management have often been able
to provide for integration of the seniority rosters, usually on the basis of the individual
employee's length of service. See Lafferty, Seniority Problems in Collective
Bargaining Agreements Arising From Business Mergers, p. 88, Feb. 1957 (unpublished
thesis in Lippincott Library, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University
of Pennsylvania). If this solution could be adapted to the problems raised by con-
solidation of manufacturing operations, the low mobility of the labor force, see Gordon
& McCorry, supra note 34, suggests that not often would many employees in the sur-
viving factory need to be laid off to accommodate arrivals from the factory which has
been shut down.
36 Indeed, if an employer moves solely to avoid having to deal with a labor union,
it may be required by the NLRB to rehire its old workers and transport them to the
new plant. 53 MicH. L. R a. 627 (1955).
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By stressing the security aspect of seniority, the court in the instant case
extended protection to important security interests of the employees which
had long been judicially neglected. While its opinion suffers from the
inevitable ambiguity of a policy decision couched in legal terms, the result
would seem, on balance, to be a just one.
